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Abstract
The current age of Postmodernist discourse involves a critique of
various forms of oppression. These can take the form of grand narratives,
foundations, and the belief in various forms of inflexible truth. But the
traditional religious discourse __ with its attempts to understand faith and
reason and its reliance on unique singular truths __ can easily lead to charges
of dogmatism. So the question is whether religion thought is sufficiently
well-equipped for opening itself to postmodern thought which tends to be
analogous, flexible and tolerant of a plurality of meanings. This paper will
enlist the aid of Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics to show how traditional
religious discourse can adapt to the postmodern age.
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One of the great challenges today is how to respond to the ten-
dency toward skepticism and relativism that dominates these changing
times. Such tendencies are engendered by the fact that we have left be-
hind a stable social and cultural order and enter now into circumstances of
profound uncertainty. The idea of progress, which has relied on the sci-
ences and technology has been called into question. Rationality once seen
as emancipatory has failed to deliver its promise. Modern man has be-
come more and more dependent and impulsive. Postmodernism sees con-
temporary culture as ephemeral and individualistic, marked by the insta-
bility of rationality, and the collapse of the great ideologies (G. Lipovetsky,
2004:69) and Grand Narratives.
Are our religions also vulnerable to the criticisms of postmodern
thoughts whose ambition is to deconstruct all kinds of domination, includ-
ing the methods and rationality of religious doctrine? The effort to under-
stand the relation between faith and reason could be suspected as being
an effort to create a Grand Narrative. Such a project would have an
ambition to lay the ultimate foundation of religious belief drawn from rea-
son. This would then lead to the claim of universality leading it into the trap
of dogmatism and of the principles of petition. So the question is whether
religion thought is sufficiently well-equipped for opening itself to postmodern
thought which tends to be analogous, flexible and tolerant of a plurality of
meanings.
The postmodern trend is willing to depart from the exigency of
absolute reason to seek the foundation of truth. This course of thought
constitutes a real challenge to religion whose claims tend to converge on
some form of unique truth. In the postmodern era, all conflicts should be
solved through discussions and negotiations. Therefore, one must elabo-
rate on a way to consensus and solidarity. The consensus must be factual,
contextual and impermanent. It must not be a form of rational consensus
which prevails universally following the illusions and myth of modernism.
Critical hermeneutics is considered as one of the  postmodern approaches.
Critical Hermeneutics and Faith
A more proper approach will make a stand for a critical rational-
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ity in the form of critical hermeneutics which adopts the argument that a
thesis is never definitive, but should be criticized, revised and improved.
There are two assumptions behind this approach: the first assumption is
that a text contains a plurality of meanings; the second assumption is that a
text can become autonomously detached from its initial production (i.e.,
distanciation of the author’s intention, the initial context, and the origin of
destination). Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is the most convenient tool for
us to use to analyze the relation between faith and reason.
Faith must be understood as “the integral response of the human
being to God who reveals himself as Savior. Faith accepts the messages,
promises and commandments of God”. (R.Latourelle, 1995:309). Faith
emphasizes two aspects:  aspects of trust and assent to the message. Faith
is not an alien phenomenon, it concerns us personally. It must be rooted in
ourselves or produced by our powers. At the same time, it has its origin in
God Himself. Therefore, in the person as subject and in its structures
(mind, psychology, all human capacities) are found the conditions required
for the possibility of faith. Its process is not a capitulation of spirit, but a
sovereign exercise in which human beings make the thinking of God their
own (ibid., 310). Reason requires that if persons are to give their assent,
they must have reasons for believing (Fides quaerens intellectum).
Reasons alone confront us with only the power of our own mind
as Latourelle writes: “The signs and his rational knowledge of them, give
man control not of the intrinsic credibility of the divine word but of his own
knowledge of the duty to believe and of his own free decision to be-
lieve…” (ibid., 312). Every message is a sign. Thus, when we deal with a
message we need a tool of analysis which enables us to understand its
content. In so doing, we better understand ourselves. Sign, symbol and
text are the mediation to a better self-comprehension. Therefore, if faith is
well rooted in one’s culture, it has a solid base in which critical reason
enlightens experience and are not alien to human beings’ origin structures.
As a tool of analysis, the role of critical hermeneutics is in line with the four
tasks of the critical reason which are, firstly, to dismantle the relation of
power by which a text is misused to disguise the legitimization of power;
secondly, to enable marginalized voices to articulate and be heard; thirdly,
to bring about a knowledge which is critical toward the complicity of
relation between power-knowledge-truth; and fourthly, to create favor-
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able conditions to form a new subjectivity whose traits are marked by
openness and tolerance.
The project of history, intended to mobilize our society attracts in
fact only a few adherents. Our society is no longer obsessed with its fu-
ture. It is neither a question of absence of insight nor of vision, but it is
proof that consumerism focuses on the now-life. The meaning of time is
dominated by the changing and ephemeral situations. The optimism of the
progress of history is replaced by the horizon of a shorter time. Today we
face the social era where hic et nunc (the here and now) are considered
pivotal.
How Can Religions Embody Faith in an Era of Uncertainty?
In this era, our society is no longer fooled by the Grand Narrative
(Hegel-Marxism, socialism, evolutionism, universalism, patriarchal ideol-
ogy), but is increasingly determined by life here and now. All these Grand
Narratives, which have promised to bring humanity to a better future,
failed in fulfilling their promise. Finally, the critical discourses manage to
unmask the stratagem of the principle of universality. Behind this doctrine
is a disguised strategy and desire for power.
The claim of the value-free and disinterestedness of knowledge is
precisely what makes us suspect the so-called scientific discourses of
disguising the will to power. The deconstruction of the relation of knowl-
edge-power-truth leads us to call into question the claim of scientific ob-
jectivity (M. Foucault), behind which is the dissimulated interest in the
legitimization of power. In brief, postmodernism enables us to deconstruct
all kinds of unjust dominations, including the most disguised and symbolic
ones.
One of postmodernism’s contributions lies in the structural reor-
ganization of the course of the social and cultural life in the advanced
democratic society (G.Lipovetsky, 2004:70). The sophistication of mass
communication facilitates exchange among nations so that they enrich one
another in the social, economic and cultural domains. But this sophisti-
cated mass media has a two-edged sword. Besides its meaningful side, it
has an ambiguous influence due to the fact that it pushes people to con-
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sume more and more.
The contemporary main episteme or structure of significance of
life is focused on economy (money). Homo oeconomicus is a fanatical
adherent to individualism motivated by his/her own interests in all aspects
of life (economy, education, politics, sex). How can such individualistic
mode of life’s influence leave a religious aspiration remained intact? Two
main religious values which consist of altruism and disciplinary norms are
called into question. The resistance against the authoritarian and disciplin-
ary norms pushes our society to enter the process of the centralization of
the role of the individual glorifying hedonism. The principles and norms
which rule social life are emptied of their transcendent dimension. There-
fore, religion must face the society’s fierce resistance whenever it inter-
venes too much in the public space. The logic of market prevails more and
more over social and religious norms. Hedonistic culture exalting self-
fulfillment and the immediate satisfaction of desires is in ascendancy. It
incites people to consume more in order to satisfy the urgency of plea-
sure.
The term “urgency” is the keyword in understanding our contem-
porary culture in its relation to time. The speed of communication in com-
bination with the logic of financial market forms an arbitrary instance to
real time. All things must be met immediately with responses. The culture
of urgency prevails in all domains.  The slowness of response to profes-
sional requests constitutes a threat to the development or even the survival
of an institution. Urgency rules over the time schedule. Therefore, the
rhythm of time requires high-speed activities and immediate professional
responses.
The culture of urgency puts in danger a profound discernment
because people find it difficult to distinguish between what is essential and
what is merely an accessory. The high-speed rhythm of activities has a
perilous impact on people’s search for meaning. It empties the question of
the meaning of life. People have no time to put distance between them-
selves and their activities. It is almost impossible to question or to give
meaning to these activities, much less to enter into a critical consideration.
The response of religions would determine the relevance of their role in
this contemporary society.
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Hermeneutics: Bridging Faith and Reason
Hermeneutics will be a very helpful method to enable us to under-
stand the complexity of the relation between faith and reason. Hermeneu-
tics is not primarily considered a tool to interpret or rediscover the inten-
tion of the author of a text. It is not a question of a reproduction of the
author’s message inserted into the text, but it must be looked at in Ricoeur's
perspective, that is, as an effort to search for the dynamic of the text
aimed by the structures of the work (1986). The ultimate objective is to
find the capacity of self-projection in the text to bring about a new world
which represents the core message.
Using hermeneutics as a method of clarifying the relation between
faith and reason, referring to P.Ricoeur, implies accepting three assump-
tions (1995:35). The first assumption is that a religious faith may be iden-
tified through its language as a kind of discourse. Whatever may be the
nature of the religious experience, it must be articulated in a language. The
second assumption is that this discourse must be understandable and com-
municable, that it be meaningful at least for the community of faith that
uses it. Furthermore, it needs to be communicable for the sake of commu-
nication with others outside of the faith community. The third assumption
is that reason under the banner of philosophy is implied in this inquiry
because this kind of discourse does not merely claim to be meaningful, but
also to be true. According to Ricoeur, philosophy is confronted by a mode
of discourse that displays claims both to meaningfulness and to fulfillment
such that new dimensions of reality and truth are disclosed (1995:36).
The role of hermeneutics is ineluctable in bridging the hiatus be-
tween faith and reason. However, it depends on the capacity to explain
that an understanding is never an immediate knowledge. In other words,
there is no self-transparency. “There is no immediate understanding of
oneself” (C.Oliviera 1990:29). Thus, understanding needs mediation. Phi-
losophy has no ambition to be a total mediation, as if reflection were
identical to intuition. Therefore, understanding does not consist of the en-
counter between “being” and “knowing”. There is a distance between the
subject reflecting and herself/himself. This distance is bridged by the me-
diation of sign, symbol and text (Ricoeur, 1986).
The mediation through sign indicates that the initial condition of
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human experiences is language: perception and desire have to be expressed
in words; and beauty needs to be described in a communicable way.
Mediation through symbolism means that all expressions could have
equivocal meanings in relation to the designation of the elements of cos-
mos (fire, water, wind); the appellation of dimensions (height, depth); and
the terming of aspects (clarity, obscurity). Finally, text is all discourse fixed
by writing. According to Ricoeur, discourse must be distinguished from
language. There are four conditions for something to be considered a
discourse: firstly, there is a subject who affirms; secondly, there is a con-
tent of the proposition which describes a world that will be represented;
thirdly, a discourse is supposed to have an audience to whom it is ad-
dressed; and fourthly, there is an aspect of temporality or the context of
proposition.
The mediation through sign and symbol is extended and modified
by the mediation through text,  but this extension implies that it uproots the
text from its initial production of discourse. Consequently, a distanciation
linked to the initial production of discourse is created: a work of discourse
becomes an autonomous object at a distance from the authorial intention,
from its initial situation, and from its primitive audience (Ricoeur, 1995:38).
That is why a discourse as a work of art is open to an infinite range of
interpretations.
The hermeneutic category of “distanciation through writing” in com-
bination with the “objectivation through structures” (Ricoeur, 1986:126)
represents the conditions of interpretation in order to enable a text to give
meaning. Both categories make up an objective pole of self-comprehen-
sion, whereas the hermeneutic category of “self-comprehension” draws
an inspiration from the “world of the text”. These last two categories form
the subjective pole of comprehension.
These four hermeneutic categories reflect a concern which does
not content itself with hermeneutics as a method (epistemology), but through
this epistemology, the existence dimension of the interpreter (ontology)
will be disclosed. From this point of view, the task of hermeneutics con-
sists in expliciting the meaning of all types of imaginable being. From the
phenomenological perspective, vision requires the display of the invisible
that is not given in the actual experience, but manifests in the form of
horizon, which is the cradle where vision is born. There is no vision cre-
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ated exterior to the interpretation. Having a vision means penetrating some-
thing promising, even if it is still dissimulated. It means that an incisive
interpretation will enable us to gain insightful understanding of a text so
that it inspires us with creative ideas.
Objectivation through structural analysis is a logical tool for ex-
plaining the relations, combinations, contradictions and comparisons of
the elements forming the text in order to display its values or richness. The
meaning will be discovered through analysis of the relations that are inter-
dependent so that language becomes a system of signs. This third herme-
neutics category is not limited only to structural analysis, but is also ex-
tended to all forms of explanation of the text. This category includes all
scientific explanations which are contributed by psychology, history, soci-
ology, anthropology, archeology, etc. The reason for this is that, in the
dialectic of explanation and understanding, those sciences serve as an
instrument for the objectivation of text by means of explaining the logical
relations of the text. Thus, their contribution is emphasized on the episte-
mological side. This approach represents the stepping-stone to reach a
better self-comprehension (ontological dimension).
The dialectical relation between explanation and understanding in
the dynamic of comprehension of the text is considered to be completion
of each other. A text has an immanent structures whis is able to be ex-
plained by structural analysis or other scientific analysis. At the same time,
the text has references to extra-linguistic. Ricoeur calls this reference to
the exterior of linguistics the world of the text which stems from neither
psychological intentions nor the breath of God, but from the mediation of
the structures of the text. It means that God’s revelation manifests itself in
the contrasts and convergence of different types of discourse such as
narration, poem, oracle, metaphor, and exhortation which are forged in
the text of the Holy Scripture.
The determining passage between objectivation through struc-
tural analysis and “self-comprehension” is the disclosure of the world of
text. This phase is pivotal because it forms and transforms the reader or
interpreter. In the Bible, this disclosure is called “Good News”, or “King-
dom of God” (P.Ricoeur, 1986). All of these epithets represent the objec-
tivity of the new existence projected by the text. This new world does not
stem from the author’s intention, but it is disclosed through the structures
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of the text. The narrative style orientates us to the signification that God is
the main actor of the history of man’s salvation. The prophetic style ex-
presses either a God who is threatening or presaging but at the same time
He is giving a promise in spite of the prominent destruction. Both ex-
amples are forms of the Bible’s proposal of the world. The capacity of the
text for disclosing a revelation derives from the contrasts and convergences
of all forms of discourse analyzed together so that hermeneutics leads to
the world proposed by the text. This world of the text will make sense
only if the reader or interpreter appropriates it.
This “appropriation” or “self-comprehension” marks the fusion
between the world proposed by the text and the concrete world of the
reader. Gadamer used the term “fusion of horizons” to refer to the en-
counter between the two worlds that are more than mere worlds. It is
called “fusion” because it is impossible for the reader to expropriate the
world of the text exhaustively and, at the same time, to leave totally the
actual world where he lives. The result is that the reader does not leave
the world intact and he does not refuse the world proposed by the text.
The world of the reader undergoes a real transformation allowing the reader
to transform and understand himself/herself better.
Distanciation: Criticism of Ideology and Deconstruction
In the process of appropriation, the distanciation from her-/him-
self is required in order to avoid a distorted meaning and as a fair effort to
prevent the arbitrariness of interpretation. Contrary to the literal meaning
of the word, distanciation is far from the notion of alienation; it suggests a
creative resolution due to its merit of enriching and purifying self-compre-
hension. The distanciation consists in the form of criticism of ideology,
deconstruction and analogy of the game.
The criticism of religion launched by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud
has a lucid significance for a more purified understanding of faith. It is
constructed exterior to the hermeneutic process. It grows as criticism of
ideology exercising the criticism of the pre-comprehensions and of the
illusions of religion. A religious conviction runs the risk of transforming
itself into an illusion if it is uprooted from the reality of life, as it is then
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analogous with wishful thinking taken for reality. Linguistically, such wish-
ful thinking is not impossible because language is not only a tool of com-
munication or means of representation. Language as speech-act
(performative utterance) is used as an instrument of action or power. On
the other hand, the social praxis is discursive in the sense that it is orga-
nized discursively by values and representations of human needs. There-
fore, it is logical that language could construct reality behind which is ex-
alted the adagio of the idealistic philosophy that “the real is rational, the
rational is real”.
Such a conviction or faith needs to be confronted with a critical
approach. That is why the thoughts of Nietzsche, Marx and Freud as
philosophy of suspicion will be apt to help to dismantle unjust relations of
power and the surreptitious manipulations. Michel Foucault affirmed that
religious discourse runs a risk of being embedded deep in the relation of
power-knowledge-truth (1976).
For a better hermeneutic understanding that focuses on the text,
these criticisms are taken as an acknowledgement of the ideological as-
sault which could be destructive, but they can be transformed into a tool
of auto-criticism that enables the purification of faith. So, the response to
those criticisms is not an apology, but an effort to domesticate or digest
the wild assaults, which could be harmful, for a better self-comprehen-
sion. This mechanism is a promising exercise because it could pedagogi-
cally bring about an attitude of religious maturity that allows our faith to
grow up and, at the same time become tough because it could disorientate
those who have a limited understanding of faith. In such a mechanism, the
adherents of religion could fall into a trap of spiritual aridity if the intellec-
tual exercise empties the spirituality of her/his lived experiences from the
horizon of faith.
The criticism of ideology defending secular humanism launches a
challenge to religions regarding whether they are able to offer their speci-
ficity in the domain of morality. Does religion enrich ethics? The answer is
that religion must not be understood in terms of enriching ethics; religion
specifies ethical acts because it defends in ethics the uniqueness of indi-
vidual (H.Cohen, 1990). Religion places ethics in a concrete community
with its organization, tradition, rites, institutions, theology and members.
In religious ethics, the beauty tends often to be marginalized or
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disregarded in favor of a focus on the question of goodness and truth. The
question of aesthetics is not totally ignored, but religion warns not to con-
fuse aesthetical taste with religious awareness. The latter can endure the
concrete individual’s sufferings, whereas aesthetics deals with some styles
that have nothing to do with suffering. Art only knows bad or beautiful
faces in their material expressions. In aesthetics, religion manifests itself
through its capacity for inciting a specific feeling irreducible to a mere
aesthetic feeling because it can transform into empathy, mercy or forgive-
ness. This religious feeling is immediately connected with the idea of God.
It represents an expression of the expectation of liberation or salvation.
Religious feeling and the promise of salvation find their articulation
in prayer. Prayer discloses its meaning when it expresses that expectation
of liberation. Consequently, the convergence between aesthetics and reli-
gion lies in prayer and specifically in mysticism that is desirous of partici-
pating in the infiniteness of the transcendent.
A problem arises because concrete religion tends to mark the law
of separation which founds the relation between God and man. Its follow-
ers will unconsciously unify this separation when they commit unscrupu-
lous violence on behalf of God. From the humanist ethical point of view,
such violence which is motivated by the transcendent reason is totally
unacceptable, while religion is still tempted to give a compromise by founding
the act of violence on the Holy Scripture as symbolical and ideological
legitimization. Accordingly, such a transcendent motivation could not be
taken for the specificity of the religious ethics; otherwise it will be con-
temptuous of humanity and incurs indignation.
In order to mark the specificity of religious ethics, religion needs
to deal with unique experience of the ethical subject that is recognition of
sinfulness, contrary to the secular humanist ethics that insists on freedom
and responsibility. This insistence defines the human as being self-confi-
dent and tending to be arrogant. The vision of religious ethics enables one
to recognize her/his weakness as a human being. Hence, the value of
religion lies in community insofar as salvation that does not in the power of
the individual but in the power of God which is revealed in His promise.
This promise is a guarantee that her/his freedom and her/his respect for
human dignity can not be separated from that process of God’s liberation.
God’s promise lays a strong foundation for the religious disciples to act
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conforming to moral virtues. That promise will only make sense if it is
guaranteed through institutions and laws that are able to organize one’s
responsibility by imposing sanction. Therefore, authentic religion is re-
quired to be able to translate God’s promise into a system of action. This
system of action must be guaranteed by collectivity because it runs a promi-
nent risk of slipping into pretense of being in a legitimate position to con-
fiscate so-called “God’s will”. Thus, a path of humility must be taken as
contra-measure in which we recognize our weakness.
According to H.Arendt (1958), one of man’s weaknesses lies in
the fact that man’s action is irreversible. When we make an error in typing
on computer, the mistake can easily be erased without leaving any trace.
But when we hurt someone, this victim will not be left intact. He/she is not
protected from an injury that could last a long time. Forgiveness  helps the
perpetrator to resume a new life. To some extent, forgiveness is an act of
forgetting someone’s mistake or of overcoming feeling resentful toward
perpetrator’s for an offense. Forgiveness transcends the rationality of ac-
tion based on the logic of reciprocity. Rather forgiveness bases on the
logic of generosity. For this reason, religion represents a community where
forgiveness becomes a source of life renewal. Only religion integrates for-
giveness as a mechanism of community renewal guaranteed by collectiv-
ity. That collectivity finds its unity by referring to the same Transcendent
whose main nature is full of mercy. Only forgiveness can break the vicious
cycle of evil and dissuade the ruse of reason from being tempted to ma-
nipulate the sacred. In order to prevent manipulation of the sacred in favor
of different vested interests, deconstruction as a tool of analysis will play a
critical role in the process of interpretation.
Deconstruction is another facet of distanciation. It is, in Ricoeur’s
point of view, understood as an effort to dismantle the reader’s interests
and the interpreter’s either conscious or unconscious motivations in front
of the text. The assumption behind this measure is that all human rational
acts are intentional. Consequently, according to the general theory of ac-
tion, an agent will be pushed by motivations or interests to achieve a goal.
The goal determines the choice of means. The means can appear in vari-
ous forms; they can even be dissimulated behind the sacred. Hence,
deconstruction serves to sound the reader out so that all of her/his inter-
ested motivations could be disclosed or unmasked.
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Such a measure is analogous with Husserl’s eèpocheè which puts
the reader’s interpretation into brackets, and suspends the immediate sei-
zure of the text so that an authentic comprehension can be acquired. By
deconstruction, the conflict or tension between different religions may be
confined within the interested interpretations of all of the protagonists. The
conflict of interests (economy or politics) disguised in a polemic of theo-
logical understandings is a significant sign indicating the lack of legitimiza-
tion.
In principle, the relation of power is asymmetric in the sense that
there is often a deficit of trust that undermines the authority (politics or
religion). The authority requires more than the trust that could be given by
the subordinates. To fill a gap in this relation, the authority misuses religion
as a system of legitimization. What is interpreted and legitimized by reli-
gion is no other pretext than the relation of power because all kinds of
power seek always for legitimization. For this reason, deconstruction plays
an important role in dismantling all vested interests.
The Analogy of the Game: the Creative Dimension of Distanciation
If the criticism of ideology and deconstruction are the negative
faces of distanciation, the analogy of the game is the positive and creative
side of distanciation. A game allows people to find out the new possibili-
ties that are imprisoned by rigid, formal and serious thought. It helps people
to discover in themselves the possibilities to change the fact that they are
restrained by a vision that is merely moral. Thus, a game brings about an
atmosphere that makes initiatives and creativities grow because through
the game, the subject is set free from social norms, social hierarchy and
everyday seriousness.
In an atmosphere of freedom, the essential phenomenon mani-
fests itself; that is the process to give birth to creativities. Ricoeur affirms
that it is primarily in the imagination and not in the will that “a new being” is
born. The capacity to be seized by new possibilities precedes the capac-
ity for choosing and deciding. The imagination represents the dimension of
the subject responding poetically to the text because it creates newness.
Accordingly, the primary destination of the text is imagination. To the imagi-
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nation, the text has conversation by suggesting new possibilities, and through
imagination the text murmurs the delightful ideas holding the images, which
will set the subject free.
A subject enjoys freedom if she/he is open to new possibilities
and not constrained by the boundaries of doctrine, religion, race or other
factors of social segregation. She/he transcends the social determination.
Such freedom is not always within reach for all people. Some religious
doctrines inculcate in the mind of their followers not to be in communica-
tion with the followers of other religions. Such an exclusive doctrine would
see the other as a threat. Exclusion is an indicator of being uprooted from
the human reality. Even if those doctrines are well-founded scripturally an
objection arises from the human ethics criterion. “According to the gen-
eral ethics standard, a religion would be true and authentic as far as it
expresses human dignity. It does not eliminate nor destroy humanity, but
preserves and promotes humanity” (H.Kung, 1991:244).
The analogy of the game finds its relevance to the plural society in
creating opportunities for informal encounters among religions in the oc-
casion of different events such as sport, theatre, music, camping, festivi-
ties, etc. These informal encounters help break the ice between people of
different religions who are not well acquainted with each other. Such an
encounter will allow people to eliminate the prejudices embedded deep in
their respective minds. When this phase of encounter is attained, a rich
dialogue of theology has the chance to be launched and organized. All
these efforts are to avoid a conflictual relationship among religions and to
build a deeper understanding.
The conflicts among the followers of different religions end in vio-
lence from a lack of religious tolerance. Even if the cause of conflict did
not primarily consist of religious issues, the atmosphere of hatred between
Muslims and Christians (the case in Indonesia) did exist, though a lot of
the members of both groups still have a good relationship and mutual
cooperation. The fundamental problem lies in the difficulty of accepting
the difference of the other. The existential question is how Muslims or
Christians can pay respect to and accept another religion, while at the
same time be convinced of the authenticity of the truth of their own reli-
gion.
The acceptance of plurality comes from an attitude of humility
..
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acknowledging the limits of human capacity to seize the perfection of God.
The different religious traditions show precisely God’s perfection: “God is
too rich and unlimited so that a religious tradition, which is of course lim-
ited, will not exhaustively be able to dip into the perfection and the fullness
of God” (E.Schillebeeckx 1992:225). The fullness of God will be better
expressed through the plurality of religions than by only one religion. Be-
hind this statement, a dimension of ethics appears as a common ground to
pay respect to human dignity.
An encounter with “the other” represents the moral moment be-
cause the other induces me to responsibility. “L’eèpiphanie du visage (the
appearance of the face) becomes precisely the expression of the unlimit-
edness of the other which reminds me of my obligation and judges me”
(Levinas,1971:215). So, Levinas declared lucidly that “a relation does
not neutralize the other, but preserves the other. The other is not the ob-
ject which is part of us nor becomes similar to us, but the other withdraws
himself to his mystery” (1982:59). The presence of the other allows me to
affirm my uniqueness in which the meaning of life makes sense. So the
presence of the other does not threaten me, but invokes me to take on a
higher task and a human vocation calling me to take responsibility. The
other does not limit my freedom. By invoking my responsibility, the other
legitimizes my freedom.
The philosophical rationality of cultural and religious plurality an-
swers to the basic need of identity. This basic need will not be satisfied
unless it is translated into a concrete policy that defines clearly the prin-
ciples of social praxis accommodating cultural plurality. The main concern
consists of creating the public space allowing the cultural interaction and a
more human communication through which a consensus will be attained.
The public space gets its significance from facilitating different cultures to
share in a strong position thanks to their dignity and self-confidence. Are
all these approaches not to be taken as a trap of relativism? How, then, to
define the mission of each religion if proselytism incurs indignation?
Luc Ferry, a French political philosopher, suggests an interesting
reflection on the vocation of every human being. The main vocation of the
religion’s followers is a concrete-universality (L.Ferry, 1998:246). We
find the analogy of this concrete-universality in works of art. A successful
piece of art is a concrete object which is universally appreciated. This
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concrete-universality is defined as the reconciliation between the particu-
lar and the universal. One’s life which is sourrounded by his/her commu-
nity represents a collective life still a particular life, but it has significance
for the whole of humanity.
Religions are called to live a similar vocation in the sense of the
invitation to be like an art-work. The vocation to be a work of art means
participating in the life of society contributing a significant meaning to the
whole society. A life as a work of art means opening the access to the
universal precisely through the authentification of the particular. This
authentification is a form of freedom which manages to detach itself from
particularism. World figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Muhammad Iqbal,
and Mother Theresa are works of art representing the concrete-univer-
sality. These figures are considered universal because they were accepted
and appreciated by all groups of religions, and concrete because their
lives were rooted in the particularity of their own religions. They contrib-
uted to the development of humanity due to their religious education and
they grew up in their own religious environment.
J. Haryatmoko SJ is lecturer in Philosophy at the Sanata Dharma
University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
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